

Seeing Behind The Scenes


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FURMANEKADAM

Audio is lagging behind in *mstsc.exe*.

FIX IT PLEASE



Audio and Video

We don't have access to the *mstsc.exe* source code.

We are on our own (nobody's going to help us).

We can use only publicly available materials.

We know nothing about *mstsc.exe*:

- What programming language it's written in
- How it downloads, stores, and plays audio and video
- Why it's getting out of sync


About me

Software Engineer, Blogger, Book Writer, Public Speaker.

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Random IT Utensils

IT, operating systems, maths, and more.

Agenda

Debugging is not hard. But it's not easy either

Patterns: MMCSS, threads, locks, memory, IPC, network, and others

Tools: Debugging, Profiling, Tracing, Memory, Network, Metrics

Debugging demos

Everyone knows that debugging is twice as hard as writing a program in the first place.

So if you're as clever as you can be when you write it, how will you ever debug it?

BRIAN KERNIGHAN

THE ELEMENTS OF PROGRAMMING STYLE, 2ND EDITION, CHAPTER 2

Debugging is twice as hard as writing the code in the first place.

Therefore, if you write the code as cleverly as possible, you are, by definition, not smart enough to debug it.

BRIAN KERNIGHAN?

It's wrong

We rarely debug just our code

- When writing the code, we made assumptions about everything around
- When debugging, we can verify these assumptions

Debugging is just a different skill

- I may not be the best cook in the world, but I can still recognize good and bad food
- Debugging happens after writing the code. During debugging, we often know what doesn't work (which side effect is incorrect)

Debugging requires different tools

- We code with IDEs (and all they bring like static code analysis, linters, etc.)
- We debug with debuggers, tracers, profilers, monitors, analyzers, etc.

Debugging is not harder than writing the code. Unfortunately, it's not easier either. It's just different.

How to Debug?

We hypothesize how things work.

To come up with reliable hypotheses, we need to know how people do things (or how things work).

We check what's going on.

Without seeing (and reproducing on demand) it's much harder.

In order to see things, we need to have tools.

Next, we confirm and reject our hypotheses.

To do that, we need to practice our skills.

Patterns

Patterns

The principle of least astonishment (POLA), also known as principle of least surprise, proposes that a **component of a system should behave in a way that most users will expect it to behave**, and therefore not astonish or surprise users

During coding, we make tons of assumptions. We rely on our knowledge about computers, networks, hardware, infrastructure...

The more patterns we know, the more efficient we are. However, we need to set our expectations right.

We need to know how others do things to be good engineers.

We are not alone

AND THE TRUTH IS OUT THERE

Music makes your games slower

Multimedia Class Scheduler Service (MMCSS) enables multimedia applications to ensure that their time-sensitive processing receives prioritized access to CPU resources.

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/multimedia-class-scheduler-service

When playing music:

- 80% of your CPU is dedicated to multimedia activities (SystemResponsiveness)
- At most 10 non-multimedia network packets are handled each millisecond (NetworkThrottlingIndex)

Do not listen to the music while playing online games.

Observing application makes it faster

Time quantum for Windows Server is set to 12 clock cycles (~180 milliseconds). For client edition, it's 2 clock cycles (~30 milliseconds).

Default quantum for Linux varies. It can be 100 milliseconds. However, threads there get time slice based on their load and can be even hundreds of milliseconds.

Foreground thread get a priority boost. Windows assigns 4 clock cycles (~60 milliseconds).

Keep the app faster by looking at it.

Other examples:

- Priority inversion if a thread waits for a resource (like mutex), the OS will boost the priorities of other threads holding the resource. Windows does that every 5 seconds.
- If a thread has been runnable for 4 seconds and hasn't been given a chance to run, the OS will boost its priority to avoid starvation. Windows does that every 1 second.

You must know bugs in the industry

Two common approaches:

- With a system-wide lock identified by name
- With a file

Do not copy blindly from Stack Overflow


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- https://www.reddit.com/r/ProgrammerHumor/ comments/f6csjp/so_both_these_tools_copied from_the_same_wrong/
- https://stackoverflow.com/questions/502303/h ow-do-i-programmatically-get-the-guid-of-anapplication-in-c-sharp-with-net/502323#502323
- https://www.pcreview.co.uk/threads/assemblyguid.1394335/



So I learned of an amusing bug today:

Docker for Windows won't run if you have the Razer Synapse driver management tool running.

But the reason is the funny part...



So, both programs want to ensure you only run one copy of themselves. So they create a global mutex using the GUID of their .NET assembly, right?

except! they do it wrong. And they both do it wrong in the same way. The code involved is something like this:

```
string.Format("Global\{0}", (object) Assembly.GetExecutingAssembly().GetType().GUID);
```

The idea is to get the GUID of the assembly that's executing and to create a GUID based on that, so now you can only run one copy of it.

But it's wrong. The .GetType() part isn't supposed to be there. That gets the type of the assembly, not the assembly itself. And that type is System.Reflection.RuntimeAssembly, part of .NET itself.

So what happens is that both of them are creating a global mutex to ensure only one copy runs, but instead of basing the GUID on their own code, they're both using the GUID of a part of .NET itself. And they're using the same one!

So how'd that happen? Well, it turns out we can tell EXACTLY how that happened. Because the answer is... STACK OVERFLOW

Back in 2009, the user "Nathan" asked how to get the GUID of the running assembly. Twelve minutes later, "Cerebrus" answered. And that answer was wrong.

A year and a month later, it was pointed out (by "Yoopergeek") that it gives the wrong GUID. Three years later, Cerebrus returns and fixes the answer. They can't delete it, because it was accepted

But because they made an error in replying to someone in 2009... this flawed code caused bugs that still exist as recently as March of 2018.

Interactions can be really surprising

DLL-injection is not hacking

Many applications use *DLL*-injection.

Windows provides multiple techniques for that:

- Hooks
- Loading libraries based on registry
- Creating threads in remote processes

Examples:

- ForceBindIP
- ConEmu
- Anti-viruses

Keyloggers are first class citizens

React to keyboard handler

Works inside our process only

Poll the keys every millisecond

- Works across RDP sessions
- Uses more CPU

Register for a hotkey with *RegisterHotKey*

- Sends WM_HOTKEY
- No polling required
- Some keys are reserved

Register a global handler for all processes with **SetWindowsHookEx**

- Requires DLL that will get injected
- Runs in the target process

Use paradoxes to lock critical sections

You can lock non-existent part of a file to use it as mutex:

 https://devblogs.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/20 140905-00/?p=63

This works between languages, machines, or even systems not connected directly but sharing some resource (like *SMB*)

Not-so-fancy solutions

- Mutexes
- Semaphores
- Spin locks
- Existence of a file
- Open socket
- Shared memory with integer variable and Compare-and-Swap

TCP is not the only way to talk

Applications can communicate with

- Object Linking and Embedding (OLE) and Component Object Model (COM)
- Network sockets, Unix sockets, Windows sockets
- Data Copy (WM_COPYDATA)
- Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE)
- Files and memory-mapped files
- Pipes, mailslots
- Signals
- Serial ports and other devices
- Clipboard
- RPC with Microsoft Interface Definition Language (MIDL)

Others can run code in our programs

- Asynchronous Procedure Call (APC)
- CreateRemoteThread
- Hooks, DLL-injection

Each thread may have a message loop

- Each message may contain additional data
- We pump messages with GetMessage, DispatchMessage, TranslateMessage, PeekMessage

Anyone can send us a message

PostMessage, PostThreadMessage, SendMessage

async/await may use the message loop (depending on the synchronization context).

```
typedef struct tagMSG {
  HWND hwnd;
  UINT message;
  WPARAM wParam;
  LPARAM lParam;
  DWORD time;
  POINT pt;
  DWORD lPrivate;
} MSG, *PMSG, *NPMSG, *LPMSG;
```

TCP optimizations break applications

Sockets after closing are in *TIME_WAIT* state for 2 minutes (can be changed).

Internet Protocol (IP) packages have TTL

• Changing *TTL* to higher value may enable tethering in some mobile carriers

Routing table is used for full-tunnel VPN-s

Can be monitored automatically to prevent tunnel escapes

TCP connections can be routed over various channels

DNS, ICMP, file systems, serial ports, sound, S3

TCP have many heuristics that may break performance

- TCP_NODELAY (Nagle's algorithm) that reduces number of packets is one of them
- https://brooker.co.za/blog/2024/05/09/nagle.html

Our code may be changed dynamically

There is no file...

Many ways of storing configuration

 INI files, registry, dotfiles, group policy, environment variables, databases, app configs

They can be redirected

- Windows can run 32-bit applications on 64-bit system with *WoW64*
- Files get redirected (C:\Windows\system32 to C:\Windows\SysWoW64)
- Registry gets redirected (HKLM\Software to HKLM\Software\Wow6432Node)

Windows supports many more techniques:

- WoW (to run 16-bit apps on 32-bit systems)
- ARM64EC
- ARM64X

This gets really dirty

- C:\Windows\System
 - 16-bit x86 binaries on 16-bit and 32-bit x86 system
- C:\Windows\System32
 - 32-bit x86 binaries on 32-bit x86 system
 - 64-bit x86 binaries on 64-bit x86 system
 - 64-bit ARM binaries on 64-bit ARM system
- C:\Windows\SysWoW64
 - 32-bit x86 binaries on 64-bit x86 system
 - 32-bit x86 binaries on 64-bit ARM system
- C:\Windows\SysArm32
 - 32-bit ARM binaries on 64-bit ARM system

Compilers turn back time

C# null-check is not explicit (same in other languages).

Syscall parameters are verified implicitly by failing and handling page fault.

JVM can remove the explicit null-check and add it back if there was a **NullPointerException**.

Many things are just executed inside a *try-catch* block.

Compilers can create a time travel.

```
public static void Foo(Class clazz){
    clazz.Method();
}

Class.Foo(Class)
    L0000: push ebp
    L0001: mov ebp, esp
    L0003: mov eax, [ecx]
    L0005: mov eax, [eax+0x28]
    L0008: call dword ptr [eax+0x10]
    L000b: pop ebp
    L000c: ret
```

We rarely run "just our code"

Frame pointer omission

- We don't save esp in ebp
- We save one general register but we decrease eperformance, break the stack traces, and break the exception handling

Devirtualization

 Instead of calling functions with *callvirt*, we call them directly since we know if there is exactly one implementation

Volatile and double-checked-lock

Compilers can cache values and break our code

Undefined behavior in C++

Whole code blocks can be removed

55	push	ebp
89 e5	mov	ebp,esp
81 ec 34 12 00 00	sub	esp,0x1234
8b 45 08	mov	eax,DWORD PTR [ebp+0x8]
89 ec 5d c3	mov pop ret	esp,ebp ebp

```
81 ec 34 12 00 00 sub esp,0x1234
8b 84 24 3c 12 00 00 mov eax,DWORD PTR [esp+0x1234+0x8]

81 c4 34 12 00 00 add esp,0x1234
c3 ret
```

26

CPU is a world on its own

Memory model

 Reads and writes can be reordered. Barriers must be used to stop that from happening (which decreases performance)

Speculative execution

CPUs may execute both code branches to improve performance

Branch prediction

- Processing an ordered array is faster than unordered one
- https://stackoverflow.com/questions/11227809/why-is-processing-a-sorted-array-faster-than-processing-an-unsorted-array
- This can be exploited (Spectre, Meltdown)

This is a super-super-super-user in Windows

Kernel mode + user mode = RING0 + RING3

This is how we typically think about security

RING0 + RING3 + RING1 + RING3

 This is how we used to run virtual machines with trap-and-emulate

Root Mode RING0 + RING3 + Non-Root Mode RING0 + RING3

 This is how we run VMs with VT-x. Can be nested with enlightened VMCS

VTI0 + VTI1

 Virtual Secure Mode (VSM) with Virtual Trust Levels (VTLs)

RING -1 + RING -2 + RING -3

 Hypervisor + System Management Mode + Intel Management Engine

Mandatory Integrity Control

- Low Metro apps
- Medium regular code
- High after we elevate with UAC or (g)sudo
- System system services
- TrustedInstaller trusted installer service

User "levels"

- Regular user
- Administrator
- SYSTEM
- TrustedInstaller

JobObjects, Silos, Server Silos

Solutions for Windows Containers

We all follow the crowd

When we don't see the code, we can't be sure how things are done.

Typically, there are many "good" ways to do every little thing in software engineering.

However, we don't reinvent the wheel every single time. We just learn the "best practices" and "software patterns".

Great minds think alike.

Tools

Seeing the Code

Visual Studio

- Visual Studio can decompile the code automatically starting with VS 2022 17.7 (since August 2023)
 - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/visualstudio/debugger/decompilation?view=vs-2022#autodecompile-code
- Works for code exploration and debugging
- You need to disable "Just My Code"

dnSPY

- https://dnspy.co/
- ~200MB binaries
- You can copy it on your production server
- Works for code exploration and debugging
- Uses ILSpy behind the scenes

Low Level Debugging

WinDBG, CDB, NTSD


- Generic debuggers with many extensions
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/debugger-download-tools

KD, NTKD

Kernel debuggers

x64dbg

More UI-friendly than WinDBG



Decompilers


ILSpy

DotPeek

IDA

Ghidra

We can always use debuggers as decompilers



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reloc 14001564c 74 0c JZ LAB 14001565a protected: virtual bool __cdecl std::ctype<wchar_t>::do_is(short,wchar_t)const __ptr64 14001564e 48 3b f8 CMP RDI, RAX JNZ LAB_140015677 Libraries: Visual Studio 2017 Release, Visual Studio 2019 Release */ 140015651 75 24 140015653 45 85 db TEST R11D, R11D 140015656 75 2c JNZ LAB 140015684 9 oool do is(longlong param 1, ushort param 2, wchar t param 3) Debug Data 140015658 eb 1d JMP LAB_140015677 LAB 14001565a XREF[1]: 14001564c(j) 12 ushort uVarl; 14001565a 8d 46 01 LEA EAX, [RSI + 0x1] 14001565d bl 01 MOV ExceptionRecord, 0x1 uVar1 = _Getwctype(param_3,(_Ctypevec *)(param_1 + 0x10)); 14001565f 41 89 47 48 dword ptr [R15 + 0x48],EAX MOV 15 return (param 2 & uVarl) != 0; 140015663 44 8b 44 ContextRecord, dword ptr [RBX + EstablisherFram... MOV d3 0c 140015668 49 8b d5 MOV EstablisherFrame,R13 14001566b 4d 03 c4 ADD ContextRecord, R12 14001566e 41 ff d0 CALL ContextRecord 140015671 44 8b 0b MOV DispatcherContext, dword ptr [RBX] Program Tree × 140015674 41 8b c9 MOV ExceptionRecord, DispatcherContext Symbol Tree 📝 🏊 🗙 LAB_140015677 XREF[4]: 1400155e9(j), 1400155f6(j), ⊕ 🍑 USER32.DLL 140015651(j), 140015658(j) Exports 140015677 ff c6 INC Functions MOV ф· 🗀 _ 140015679 44 8b cl ContextRecord, ExceptionRecord 14001567c 3b f1 CMP ESI, ExceptionRecord ⊕ @ BuildCatchObject 14001567e Of 82 56 JC LAB 1400155da ff ff ff ⊕ 🗀 do_ LAB 140015684 XREF[41: 1400154f4(j), 1400155d1(j), ⊕- f entr 140015644(j), 140015656(j) 140015684 b8 01 00 EAX, 0x1 ⊕- 🗀 F 00 00 LAB 140015689 1400155bf(j) 140015689 4c 8d 5c R11=>local_28, [RSP + 0x40] ⊕ f use_facet<> 24 40 14001568e 49 8b 5b 30 MOV RBX, qword ptr [R11 + local_res8] - 🗀 Labels 140015692 49 8b 6b 38 MOV RBP, qword ptr [R11 + local res10] Classes 140015696 49 8b 73 40 MOV RSI, qword ptr [Rl1 + local_res18] - 📺 () Namespaces 14001569a 49 8b e3 MOV RSP,R11 Filter: 14001569d 41 5f POP R15 14001569f 41 5e POP R14 🛅 Data Type M... 🕼 🔻 📦 🔻 🔭 🔭 🔻 🗶 1400156a1 41 5d POP R13 POP 1400156a3 41 5c R12 👬 Data Types 1400156a5 **5f** POP RDI BuiltInTypes 1400156a6 c3 RET SystemEater.exe basetsd.h LAB_1400156a7 XREF[1]: 14002606c(*) ⊕ 🋅 CFG 1400156a7 cc INT3 in crtdefs.h ⊕ Demangler ⊕ 🋅 DOS * Library Function - Single Match i ehdata.h excpt.h Console - Scripting mbstring.h ⊕ 🋅 PDB ⊕ 🛅 PE 🗓 🫅 std stdlib.h i time.h i wchar.h i winbase.h ⊕ 🋅 WinDef.h winnls.h winnt.h in. in winred h Filter:

Profilers

Visual Studio Diagnostic Tools

- CPU Profile
 - You need to disable "Show Just My Code" in the CPU Usage pane
 - Shows flamegraphs
- Memory snapshots
- File reads and writes
- Database queries
- Async activities
- Events
- Counters
- https://learn.microsoft.com/enus/visualstudio/profiling/profiling-featuretour?view=vs-2022


Visual Studio Instrumentation


dotnet-trace

DotTrace

Windows Performance Toolkit


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




Double-click a function to view available source information








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
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
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
Ready

Call Stack Breakpoints Exception Settings Command Window Immediate Window Output Autos Locals Watch I Inreads I









Ready

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
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
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
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
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




Source View **▼ □ ×** ☐ ResourceHog.cs ☐ Decompiled source Show IL code Open in Visual Studio @ TIKET_COCKE_TIMETITIE (SOFTIMARY) (TYMPPTTCGCTOH (MPPFGCH)) "Installed", 45 defaultValue: null 46 47) as string; 49 if (nonExistentRegistry != null) 50 51 Console.WriteLine("Change registry key path ;)"); 52 53 54 55 private static void AccessFile() 56 57 if(File.Exists(@"C:\Path.txt")) 58 59 Console.WriteLine("Change file path ;)"); 60 61 62 63 private static void CheckNetwork() UdpClient udpClient = new UdpClient(); 65 byte[] payload = Encoding.ASCII.GetBytes("Some content"); 53.7% 66 udpClient.Send(payload, payload.Length, "127.0.0.1", 11000); 46.2% 68 69 private static void AllocateMemory() 70 71 72 bigObjects.Add(new SomeBigObject()); 73 74 private static void ThrowException() 75 76 77 try 78 throw new Exception("Fancy Exception"); 80 catch(Exception e) 28.09.202484







Strace


Process Monitor

API Monitor

Process Monitor - C:\Users\afish\Desktop\AdditionalTools\Traces\Logfile.PML

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6:01:3	SystemEater.exe		RegOpenKey	HKLM/system/curentcontrolSet/Control/Sp GP/DLL	REPARSE	Desired Access: Read				
6:01:3	SystemEater.exe	7320	RegOpenKey	HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Sp\GP\DLL	NAME NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Read				
	SystemEater.exe SystemEater.exe	7320	RegOpenKey RegQueryValue	HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\Code dentifiers HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\safer\code dentifiers\TransparentEnabled	SUCCESS NAME NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Query Value Length: 80				
	SystemEater.exe		RegCloseKey	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\safer\codelentfilers	SUCCESS	Edigal. 00				
	SystemEater.exe		RegOpenKey	HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers	NAME NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Query Value				
6:01:3	SystemEater.exe SystemEater.exe		RegOpenKey RegOpenKey	HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\FileSystem\ HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\FileSystem	REPARSE SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read Desired Access: Read				
6:01:3	SystemEater.exe	7320	K RegQueryValue	HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\FileSystem\LongPathsEnabled	SUCCESS	Type: REG_DWORD, Length: 4, Data: 0				
	SystemEater.exe SystemEater.exe	7320	KegCloseKey Load Image	HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\FileSystem C:\Windows\System32\user32.dll	SUCCESS SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x7fff789d0000, Image Size: 0x19d000				
6:01:3	SystemEater.exe		Load Image	C:\Windows\System32\win32u.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x7fff77c50000, Image Size: 0x130000				
6:01:3	SystemEater.exe	7320	😋 Load Image	C:\Windows\System32\gdi32.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x7fff78180000, Image Size: 0x2b000				
6:01:3	SystemEater.exe SystemEater.exe	7320	♣ Load Image ♣ Load Image	C:\Windows\System32\gdi32full dll C:\Windows\System32\msvcp_win.dll	SUCCESS SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x7fff77c80000, Image Size: 0x117000 Image Base: 0x7fff77800000, Image Size: 0x9d000				
	SystemEater.exe		RegOpenKey	C. Williadwa (Systemica Vinisted), with call in the Committee of the Commi	REPARSE	Desired Access: Query Value, Enumerate Sub Keys				
6:01:3	SystemEater.exe	7320	K RegOpenKey	HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Query Value, Enumerate Sub Keys				
	SystemEater.exe		RegQueryValue RegCloseKey	HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\ResourcePolicies HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager	NAME NOT FOUND SUCCESS	Length: 24				
	SystemEater.exe		Load Image	C.Windows/System32.urbase.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x7fff77ab0000, Image Size: 0x100000				
6:01:3	SystemEater.exe	7320	Thread Create		SUCCESS	Thread ID: 7584				
	SystemEater.exe SystemEater.exe		Thread Create Load Image	C:\Windows\System32\shell32.dll	SUCCESS SUCCESS	Thread ID: 13952 Image Base: 0x7fff78d70000, Image Size: 0x76f000				
6:01:3	SystemEater.exe	7320	Thread Create	C. Avirtuows (System 22 or lett 22 utility)	SUCCESS	Thread ID: 11028				
6:01:3	SystemEater.exe	7320	Cad Image	C:\Windows\System32\advapi32.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x7fff79890000, Image Size: 0xb0000				
	SystemEater.exe SystemEater.exe		🔐 Load Image 🔐 Load Image	C:\Windows\System32\msvcrt.dll C:\Windows\System32\sechost.dll	SUCCESS SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x7fff78420000, Image Size: 0x9e000 Image Base: 0x7fff796f0000, Image Size: 0xa0000				
	SystemEater.exe		Load Image	C. Windows \System 32 \port 4.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x7fff78290000, Image Size: 0x123000				
6:01:3	SystemEater.exe	7320	👣 Load Image	C:\Windows\System32\bcrypt.dll	SUCCESS	Image Base: 0x7fff77c20000, Image Size: 0x27000				
6:01:3	SystemEater.exe SystemEater.exe		KegOpenKey KegOpenKey	HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Nls\Sorting\Versions HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Nls\Sorting\Versions	REPARSE SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read Desired Access: Read				
6:01:3	SystemEater.exe	7320	RegQueryValue	HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Nis\Sorting\Versions\(Default)	SUCCESS	Type: REG_SZ, Length: 18, Data: 00060305				
	SystemEater.exe			HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Nls\Sorting\Versions\000603xx	SUCCESS	Type: REG_SZ, Length: 26, Data: kemel32.dll				
	SystemEater.exe SystemEater.exe	7320 7320		C:\Windows\System32\mm32.dll .C:\Windows\System32\mm32.dll	SUCCESS SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read Attributes, Disposition: Open CreationTime: 6/15/2024 11:27:07 PM, LastAcces				
6:01:3	SystemEater.exe	7320	CloseFile	C. Windows \System 32 \mm32.dll	SUCCESS	Cleation filline. 0/13/2024 11.27.07 FM, Last/Acces				
	SystemEater.exe	7320	Create File	C:\Windows\System32\mm32.dll	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read Data/List Directory, Synchr				
	SystemEater.exe SystemEater.exe	7320 7320		.C.\Windows\System32\imm32.dll .C.\Windows\System32\imm32.dll	FILE LOCKED WITH ONLY READERS SUCCESS	SyncType: SyncTypeCreateSection, PageProtectio AllocationSize: 188,416, EndOfFile: 184,432, Numb				
6:01:3	SystemEater.exe			.C:\Windows\System32\mm32.dll	SUCCESS	SyncType: SyncTypeOther				
6:01:3	SystemEater.exe	7320	CloseFile	C:\Windows\System32\imm32.dll	SUCCESS					
6:01:3	SystemEater.exe SystemEater.exe	7320	🥁 Load Image ∰RegOpenKey	C:\Windows\System32\imm32.dll HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Error Message Instrument\	SUCCESS REPARSE	Image Base: 0x7fff79860000, Image Size: 0x2f000 Desired Access: Read				
6:01:3	SystemEater.exe	7320	RegOpenKey	HIKLM/System/CurrentControlSet/ControlSet/ Message Instrument	NAME NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Read				
6:01:3	SystemEater.exe	7320	K RegOpenKey	HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Query Value, Enumerate Sub Keys				
	SystemEater.exe SystemEater.exe		RegOpenKey RegOpenKey	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\Current\Version\Image File Execution Options\SystemEater.exe HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Display	NAME NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Query Value, Enumerate Sub Keys Desired Access: Read				
6:01:3	SystemEater.exe	7320	RegOpenKey	HIKLM Software Volicies Microsoft Windows Obsplay HKLM Software Volicies Microsoft Windows Obsplay	NAME NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Read				
6:01:3	SystemEater.exe	7320	RegOpenKey	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\SystemEater.exe	NAME NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Query Value, Enumerate Sub Keys				
	SystemEater.exe SystemEater.exe		RegOpenKey RegOpenKey	HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Display HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Display	NAME NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Read Desired Access: Read				
6:01:3	SystemEater.exe	7320	RegOpenKey	HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\NT\Current\Version\GRE_Initialize	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read Desired Access: Read				
6:01:3	SystemEater.exe	7320	RegQueryValue	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize\DisableMetaFiles	NAME NOT FOUND	Length: 20				
	SystemEater.exe SystemEater.exe	7320	RegCloseKey RegOpenKey	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\Current\Version\GRE_Initialize HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\Current\Version\GRE_Initialize	SUCCESS SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read				
6:01:3	SystemEater.exe	7320	RegQueryValue	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\GRE_Initialize\DisableUmpdBufferSizeCheck	NAME NOT FOUND	Length: 20				
	SystemEater.exe	7320	K RegCloseKey	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\Current\Version\GRE_Initialize	SUCCESS	8				
	SystemEater.exe SystemEater.exe	7320	∰RegOpenKey ∰RegOpenKey	HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\Current\Version\Image File Execution Options\SystemEater.exe HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Control Panel\Desktop	NAME NOT FOUND NAME NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Read Desired Access: Read				
6:01:3	SystemEater.exe	7320	RegOpenKey	HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Control Panel\Desktop	NAME NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Read Desired Access: Read				
6:01:3	SystemEater.exe	7320	RegOpenKey	HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read				
6:01:3	SystemEater.exe SystemEater.exe		RegQueryValue RegCloseKey	HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop\EnablePerProcessSystemDPI HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop	NAME NOT FOUND SUCCESS	Length: 20				
6:01:3	SystemEater.exe	7320	RegOpenKey	TINEO VOORBOT BEER VOORBOT	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read				
6:01:3	SystemEater.exe	7320	K RegQueryValue	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\Current\Version\Compatibility32\SystemEater	NAME NOT FOUND	Length: 172				
	SystemEater.exe SystemEater.exe		RegCloseKey RegOpenKey	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Compatibility32 HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\ME Compatibility	SUCCESS NAME NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Read				
	SystemEater.exe	7320	RegOpenKey	HKLM HKLM	SUCCESS	Desired Access: Nead Desired Access: Maximum Allowed, Granted Acces				
6:01:3	SystemEater.exe	7320	K RegQueryKey	HKLM	SUCCESS	Query: HandleTags, HandleTags: 0x0				
	SystemEater.exe SystemEater.exe	7320	RegOpenKey RegQueryValue	HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\LoadAppInit DLLs	SUCCESS SUCCESS	Desired Access: Read Type: REG_DWORD, Length: 4, Data: 0				
6:01:3	SystemEater.exe SystemEater.exe	7320	RegCloseKey	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\T\CurrentVersion\Windows\LoadAppInit_ULLs HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\T\CurrentVersion\Windows\Today	SUCCESS	rype, n.c.a_bwonb, tengin, 4, bata; 0				
6:01:3	SystemEater.exe	7320	K RegOpenKey	HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\Current\Version\Image File Execution Options\SystemEater.exe	NAME NOT FOUND	Desired Access: Query Value, Enumerate Sub Keys				
	SystemEater.exe SystemFater.exe		RegOpenKey	HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager	REPARSE SUCCESS	Desired Access: Query Value, Enumerate Sub Keys Desired Access: Query Value, Enumerate Sub Keys				
	SystemEater.exe SystemEater.exe	7320	RegOpenKey RegQueryValue	HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\ResourcePolicies	NAME NOT FOUND	Length: 24				
6:01:3	SystemEater.exe	7320	RegClose Key	HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager	SUCCESS					
6:01:3	SystemEater.exe	7320	QueryNameInfo	.C:\Users\afish\Desktop\msp_windowsinternals\SystemEater\bin\Release\net6.0\SystemEater.exe	SUCCESS	Name: \Users\afish\Desktop\msp_windowsintema				
er i				LIL CALL A CAND DE ANTON DE LATE AL CURMO						



Ready

Mode: Portable

Memory

Visual Studio

WinDBG

WinObj

TaskManager, ProcessExplorer

VMMap

Name /	Туре
784HWNDInterface:1003c	Section
₹ AppContainerNamedObjects	SymbolicLink
☐ DBWinMutex	Mutant
↑ DWM_DX_FULLSCREEN_TRANSITION_EVENT	Event
⚠ DwmComposedEvent_1	Event
⚠ EventRitExited	Event
⚠ EventShutDownCSRSS	Event
₹ Global	SymbolicLink
₹ Local	SymbolicLink
⚠ ScNetDrvMsq	Event
₹ Session	SymbolicLink
SessionImmersiveColorMutex	Mutant
■ SessionImmersiveColorPreference	Section
SIPC_{2819B8FF-EB1C-4652-80F0-7AB4EFA88BE4}	ALPC Port
	Mutant
₮ SM0:1924:120:WilError_03_p0	Semaphore
₮ SM0:1924:120:WilError_03_p0h	Semaphore
₽ SM0:1924:304:WilStaging_02	Mutant
₹ SM0:1924:304:WilStaging_02_p0	Semaphore
₮ SM0:1924:304:WilStaging_02_p0h	Semaphore
	Mutant
₮ SM0:1948:120:WilError_03_p0	Semaphore
₮ SM0:1948:120:WilError_03_p0h	Semaphore
₽ SM0:1948:304:WilStaging_02	Mutant
₮ SM0:1948:304:WilStaging_02_p0	Semaphore
₮ SM0:1948:304:WilStaging_02_p0h	Semaphore
₽ SM0:796:304:WilStaging_02	Mutant
₮ SM0:796:304:WilStaging_02_p0	Semaphore
₮ SM0:796:304:WilStaging_02_p0h	Semaphore
△ SM0:864:120:WilError_03	Mutant
₮ SM0:864:120:WilError_03_p0	Semaphore
₮ SM0:864:120:WilError_03_p0h	Semaphore
△ SM0:864:304:WilStaging_02	Mutant
₮ SM0:864:304:WilStaging_02_p0	Semaphore
₮ SM0:864:304:WilStaging_02_p0h	Semaphore
1 ThemesStartEvent	Event
⚠ WinSta0_DesktopSwitch	Event
⚠ (773F1B9A-35B9-4E95-83A0-A210F2DE3B37}-request	Event
⚠ {773F1B9A-35B9-4E95-83A0-A210F2DE3B37}-running	Event
<u>↑</u> {773F1B9A-35B9-4E95-83A0-A210F2DE3B37}-sdl	Event
⚠ {DFFDE213-8CB4-46a9-90EB-3DA843AF66F9}-request2	Event

SymLink


\BaseNamedObjects


\Sessions\BNOLINKS

\Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects

\Sessions\1\AppContainerNamedObjects

Activate Windows
Go to Settings to activate Window





<u>File Edit View Debug Window Help</u>

```
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 Time (ms) Location
 Response
 Deferred
                                                                                              srv*C:\tmp*http://msdl.microsoft.com/download/symbols
 Symbol search path is: srv*C:\tmp*http://msdl.microsoft.com/download/symbols
Executable search path is:
 Windows 10 Version 19045 MP (8 procs) Free x64
Product: WinNt, suite: SingleUserTS
Edition build lab: 19041.1.amd64fre.vb_release.191206-1406
 Machine Name:
 Debug session time: Thu Aug 15 06:53:16.000 2024 (UTC - 7:00)
System Uptime: 0 days 0:36:23,449
Process Uptime: 0 days 0:00:18.000
 This dump file has an exception of interest stored in it.
The stored exception information can be accessed via .ecxr. (2e48.2c50): CLR exception - code e0434f4d (first/second chance not available)
For analysis of this file, run <u>lanalyze -v</u>
ntdll!NtWaitForSingleObject+0x14:
 00007ffb 90d8d5e4 c3
  0:000> kb
  # RetAddr
00 00007ffb`8e6a920e
                                                      Call Site
ntdl!!NtVaitForSingleObject+0x14
                                                                                                                                                                                                       REMNELSES WaitForSingleObjectEx+0x8e

coreclr CLREventWaitHelper2+0x6 [Naw work) associative with a property of the corecle CLREventWaitHelper2+0x6 [Naw work) associative with a property of the corecle CLREventWaitHelper2+0x6 [Naw work) associative with a post of the corecle CLREventWaitHelper2+0x6 [Naw work) associative with a post of the corecle CLREventBase: Wait+0x12 [Naw work) associative with a post of the corecle CLREventBase: Wait+0x12 [Naw work) associative with a post of the corecle CLREventBase: Wait+0x12 [Naw work) associative with a post of the corecle CLREventBase: Wait+0x12 [Naw work) associative with a post of the corecle CLREventBase: Wait+0x12 [Naw work) associative with a post of the corecle CLREventBase with a post of the corecle CLREve
      00007ffa`da2152e0
                                                      00000000,00000000 00000000,00000000 000089,0000000 0000000,000001fc
                                                                                                                                                                                                          KERNELBASE!WaitForSingleObjectEx+0x8e
       (Inline Function)
                                                      00000000`04242420 00000000`00000000 00007ffb`8e6bb699 00000218`00000003
      00007ffa`da4903dc
      (Inline Function)
      (Inline Function)
      00007ffa`da36900a
                                                      00000001'00000000 00007ffa'000aa028 00000000'0002a028 00007ffb'0002a028
       (Inline Function)
       00007ffa`da2b94f0
                                                      00000218'7a49be50 00000218'7a42cfb0 00000218'7a410c90 00007ffb'90d1f2c7
      (Inline Function)
                                                      0000008c'63d9e3a0 0000000'00000000 00000218'7a42d450 00000000'00000000
      00007ffa`da3e79d6
      (Inline Function)
        00007ffa`da538c0f
                                                      0000008c'63d9e3a0 00000218'7a42d450 00000218'7a42d450 00007ffa'7a7ae5c1
      (Inline Function)
(Inline Function)
       00007ffa`da5385ea
                                                      00007ffa`da53838b
00007ffa`da52da77
00007ffa`da3b1de1
                                                        00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000218`7a499e50 00000000`00000001
                                                      00007ffa'da2d9272
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                eedbginterfaceimpl.inl @ 381
                                                                                                                                                                                                        | corectrientowowagernxceptionIntertacewrapper::rirstLhancemanagedLxceptionHvx846[D_Na_work]\ser\corectryneedbunter
| corectrientowowagernxceptionCorecsManagedCxceptionVx46[D_Na_work]\ser\corectryneexceptionhandling.cpp @ 2583]
| corectrientowowagernxceptionNewcorectryneexceptionNewcorectryneexceptionhandling.cpp @ 1937]
| corectrientowowagernxceptionNewcorectryneexceptionhandling.cpp @ 1066]
| ntdllRtlpExecuteHandlerForExceptionHoxf
| ntdllRtlpExecuteHandlerForExceptionHoxf
| ntdllRtlDispatchExceptionHox244
| ntdllRtlUserExceptionDispatch40x24
      00007ffa`da2da4eb
00007ffa`da2d9f1c
     00007ffb 90d9292f
00007ffb 90d9292f
00007ffb 90d9143e
00007ffb 8e6bb699
                                                     00007ffa`da2d669e
00007ffa`da2d5a0f
00007ffa`7a7ae5c1
                                                      00000218:00411178 0000008c-63d9-0f0 00000218:7c4172b0 00007ffc-da2933fe-
00000000 700001f 00000218:0040ffa8 00000218:0041178 00000218:0011cdb0
48dcbd31:93f3b66f 00007ffc-d99ebbb7 3fffffff fffffff 00000218:0041178
                                                                                                                                                                                                           KERNELBASE | RaiseException+0x69
                                                                                                                                                                                                           coreclr|RaiseTheExceptionInternalOnly+0x28a [D:\a\ work\1\s\src\coreclr\vm\excep.cpp @ 2806] coreclr|II_Throw+0xdf [D:\a\ work\1\s\src\coreclr\vm\ithelpers.cpp @ 4119]
                                                     00007ffa`7a7a839d
                                                                                                                                                                                                            0x00007ffa 7a7ae5c1
     00007ffa`7a7a7d3e
00007ffa`da33af03
                                                                                                                                                                                                          0x00007ffa`7a7a839d
0x00007ffa`7a7a7d3e
       00007ffa'da258376
                                                                                                                                                                                                         corecir[CallDescrWorkerInternal+0x83]
corecir[MethodDescCallSite::CallTergetWorker+0x176 [D:a work]ssrc\corecir\wn\callhelpers.cpp @ 551]
corecir[MethodDescCallSite::Call+0xb [D:a work]ssrc\corecir\wn\callhelpers.pp @ 458]
corecir[MethodDescCallSite::Call+0xb [D:a work]ssrc\corecir\wn\ssembly.cpp @ 1683]
corecir[MunMainInternal+0xl1] [D:a work]ssrc\corecir\wn\ssembly.cpp @ 1672]
corecir[MunMainInternal+0xl2] [D:a work]ssrc\corecir\wn\ssembly.cpp @ 1672]
corecir[CarlSite:]:ExecuteAssembly+0xl6 [D:a work]ssrc\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\corecir\wn\core
                                                                                                                                                                                                           coreclr!CallDescrWorkerInternal+0x83
      00007ffa`da2df3d7
                                                      (Inline Function)
00007ffa'da2df256
                                                       0000021810000a010 0000021810000a010 0000000100000000 0000008c163d9eb58
      00007ffa`da2df105
                                                      00007ffa da2deec6
00007ffa da2f6212
00007ffa e09f972b
                                                       00000218`7a4c9060 00000218`7a4127b0 00000218`7a467e60 00000218`7a4127b0
      (Inline Function)
00007ffa`e09f9a5c
00007ffa`e09fa3f7
                                                      .0000021817a3f9988.0000008c163d9f169.00007ffa1e0a3bc40.0000021817a3f9988
                                                        0000000`0000000 00000218`7a3f9980 00000218`7a3f9980 0000000`0000000
      00007ffa`e0a5b800
                                                       00007ffb`8e51f4e8 00007ffa`e09fc0f0 00007ffa`e09fc0f0 00000000`00000001
                                                                                                                                                                                                          hostire lexecute_app+0x330 [D\a work\]\s\s\rc\native\corehost\fix\]k muser.cpp @ 145]
hostire lexecute_app+0x330 [D\a\work\]\s\rc\native\corehost\fix\]k muser.cpp @ 533]
hostire lexecute+0xaa [D\a\work\]\s\rc\native\corehost\fix\]k muser.cpp @ 533]
hostire lex nuser t::execute+0x494 [D\a\work\]\s\rc\native\corehost\fix\]k muser.cpp @ 1018]
hostire lexecute+0x494 [D\a\work\]\s\rc\native\corehost\fix\]k muser.cpp @ 579]
    c 00007ffa`e0a5e48a
d 00007ffa`e0a60746
                                                      00000218'7a40e5c0 0000008c'63d9f500 0000000'00000000 00000000'00000000 00007ffa'e0a99868 00000218'7a407d30 000008c'63d9f440 000008c'63d9f3f0
      00007ffa`e0a5eaf4
                                                       0000008c\63d9f500 0000008c\63d9f520 0000008c\63d9f471 00000000\00000013
 2f 00007ffa`e0a585c3
*** WARNING: Unable to
                                                       0000008c`63d9f520 00000218`7a407e20 00000000`0000001 00000000`0000005e
                                                   erify_checksum_for_SystemEater.exe
: 00007ffb`8e51f4e8_00007ffa`e0a59a90_00007ffa`e0a59a90_00000218`7a3fbf10_
     00007ff6`20bf1eb8
                                                                                                                                                                                                          00007ff6'20bfc3d0 00000000'00000007 00000218'7a3f9980 00000000'0000005e
00000000'00000000 00000218'7a3f9980 0000000'00000000 00000000'00000000
      00007ff6`20bf222b
      00007ff6`20bf36d8
      (Inline Function)
      00007ffb\903a7374
                                                       00007ffb\90d3cc91
                                                      0000000,0000000 0000000,0000000 0000000,0000000 0000000 0000000,000000
                                                                                                                                                                                                          kernel32|BaseThreadInitThunk+0x14
ntdl1|RtlUserThreadStart+0x21
    :000> !threads
  ThreadCount:
  UnstartedThread:
 BackgroundThread
 PendingThread:
 DeadThread
 Hosted Runtime:
                                                                             OSID ThreadOBJ
                            2c50 000002187A49BE50
                             1f04 000002187A4C7A90
 0:000> !clrstack
OS Thread Id: 0x2c50 (0)
Child SP
                                                              IP Call Site
  0000008C63D9E3A0 00007ffa7a7as5c1 SystemEaterDependency ResourceHog.ThrowException() [C:\Users\afish\Desktop\msp_windowsinternals\SystemEaterDependency\ResourceHog.cs @ 79] 000008C63D9E2B0 00007ffa7a7a833d SystemEaterDependency ResourceHog.cs (@ 79] 000008C63D9E2B0 00007ffa7a7a33d SystemEaterDependency ResourceHog.cs (@ 79] 000008C63D9E2B0 00007ffa7a7a33d SystemEaterDependency ResourceHog.cs (@ 79] 000008C63D9E2B0 00007ffa7a7a3d SystemEater\Program.cs (@ 9]
```


Dump C:\Users\afish\Desktop\AdditionalTools\Traces\SystemEater.dmp - WinDbg:10.0.22621.1778 AMD64

File Edit View Debug Window Help

/ffa/a8/U/98 7ffa7a8caf80 7ffa7a8e8560 184 System.WeakKeterence<System.Dlagnostics.Tracing.EventSource>[]
184 System.Buffers.ArrayPoolEventSource 184 System . Net . NetEventSource 7ffa7a8ed4d0 7ffa7a875310 7ffa7a876530 184 System. Net. NetEventSource 192 System. Reflection. RuntimeModule 192 System Reflection RuntimeAssembly 192 System Reflection MemberFilter 192 System UInt32 7ffa7a816e10 7ffa7a81d388 7ffa7a8c8370 7ffa7a8c8370 7ffa7a85d970 7ffa7a895208 7ffa7a88fb88 192 System, UInt32
200 System, Collections. Generic. HashSet<System.RuntimeType>+Entry[]
200 System. Globalization NumberFormatInfo
208 System. Globalization CalendarData[]
208 System. Double[]
208 System. Double[]
209 System. Diagnostics. Tracing.EventSourceAttribute[]
224 System. Diagnostics. Tracing.EventSourceAttribute[]
224 System. RuntimeType+RuntimeTypeCache+MemberInfoCache<System.Reflection.RuntimeFieldInfo>
225 System.Type[]
240 System.Diagnostics.Tracing.EventTask 7ffa7a89c578 7ffa7a89c578 7ffa7a87d058 7ffa7a873608 7ffa7a873868 240 System Diagnostics. Tracing EventOpcode 240 System Diagnostics. Tracing EventOpcode 240 System Buffers. TIsOverFerCoreLockedStacksArrayPool<System.Char>+PerCoreLockedStacks[] 255 Internal_Win2S_SafeHandles. SafeKegistryHandle 10 7ffa7a8cad78 7ffa7a8cad78 7ffa7a85f160 7ffa7a8c64d8 7ffa7a88db68 7ffa7a873370 7ffa7a8edbf8 264 System.TimeZoneInfo+AdjustmentRule 264 System. InmeLoneInfo+Adjustmentrule
279 System. Boolean[]
280 System. Diagnostics. Tracing. EventSourceAttribute
280 System. Net. Sockets. SocketsTelemetry
288 System. Collections. Generic. Dictionary(System.String, System.Object)+Entry[]
288 Microsoft Win32. RegistryKey
352 System. Diagnostics. Tracing. EventCommandEventArgs 7114748840110 7ffa7a82ed28 7ffa7a8e1a70 7ffa7a870728 7ffa7a815fd0 360 System Int32 376 System Ulnt64[] 384 System Diagnostics Tracing RuntimeEventSource 384 System Action 7ffa7a8a6658 7ffa7a83e3b0 7ffa7a8c3a00 7ffa7a8c3a00 7ffa7a8c59b0 384 System.Action
400 System.TimeZoneInfo
432 System.Reflection.RuntimePropertyInfo[][]
438 System.Reflection.RuntimePropertyInfo[][]
448 System.Golbalization.CultureInfo
456 System.Buffers TlsOverPerCoreLockedStacksArrayPool<System.Char>+ThreadLocalArray[]
480 System.Collections.Generic Dictionary<System.String, System.String>
488 System.Reflection.RuntimePropertyInfo[]
488 System.Reflection.RuntimePropertyInfo[]
640 System.InfPtr[]
640 System.Diagnostics Tracing ScalarTypeInfo
640 System.Diagnostics Tracing ScalarTypeInfo
640 System.Func(System.Object, System.Diagnostics.Tracing.PropertyValue> 7ffa7a88ea98 7ffa7a85bfb0 7ffa7a8c9698 7ffa7a8c9698 7ffa7a8815b8 7ffa7a83f1b0 7ffa7a8c0f30 7ffa7a8c2410 7ffa7a8c20a0 7ffa7a8502c8 7ffa7a8ce5c8 680 System.UInt16[]
768 Interop+Advapi32+EtwEnableCallback
816 SystemEaterDependency SomeBigObject 7ffa7a817c68 7ffa7a879f18 888 System Int64 936 System.Reflection.RuntimePropertyInfo 1,136 SystemEaterDependency.SomeBigObject[] 1,244 System.UInt32[] 7ffa7a8cf3b0 7ffa7a8c4b78 1,244 System UInt32[]
1,344 System Diagnostics Tracing EventSource+OverrideEventProvider
1,408 Microsoft Win32 SafeHandles SafeRegistryHandle
1,408 System Net IPRAddress[]
1,408 System Net IPRAddress[]
1,408 System Net Sockets UdpClient
1,760 System Net Sockets UdpClient
1,760 System Net Internals SocketAddress
1,824 System Globalization CultureData
1,824 System Globalization CultureData
1,880 System Net IPAddress
2,072 System UIntf[][]
2,104 System UIntf[][]
2,105 System Victorian System System System System System System Victorian System Sy 12 44 44 2,104 System. Net | Sockets | SafeSocketHandle 2,736 System. SByte[] 3,040 System. RuntimeType 3,120 System. Reflection. MethodInfo[] 3.552 System. Diagnostics. Tracing. EventKeywords
3.576 System. Diagnostics. Tracing. EventKeywords
3.576 System. Diagnostics. Tracing. EventLevel
3.576 System. Reflection. RuntimeExceptionHandlingClause[]
3.584 System. Reflection. MdFieldInfo
3.584 System. Reflection. RuntimeLocalVariableInfo[] 149 149 7ffa7a89c8c0 7ffa7a89c8c0 7ffa7a8a1460 7ffa7a8747d8 7ffa7a89eee0 56 149 24 3,648 System.RuntimeType+RuntimeTypeCache 3,792 System.Collections.Generic.Dictionary(System.UInt64, System.String>+Entry[] ffa7a83b9f0 2187a46ad20 4,048 System.String[] 4,600 Free 4,800 Free 4,792 System.Diagnostics.Tracing.EventAttribute[] 4,864 System.Exception 5,632 System.Het.Sockets.Socket 150 38 117 'ffa7a890878 'ffa7a8e7310 7,120 System.Reflection.RuntimeMethodInfo[]
7,656 System.Reflection.RuntimeMethodInfo[]
8,832 System.Collections.Generic.Dictionary(System.Int32, System.String>+Entry[]
9,536 System.Reflection.RuntimeMethodBody 9,538 System. Reflection. Runtimemethodology 9,600 System. Diagnostics. Tracing. EventAttribute 10,040 System. RuntimeType[] 13,112 System. RuntimeEythodInfoStub 17,544 System. Reflection. ParameterInfo[] 18,880 System. Signature 19,440 System. Diagnostics. Tracing. EventParameterInfo[] 7ffa7a873908 7ffa7a873908 7ffa7a87e708 7ffa7a87f4d8 7ffa7a88ef88 149 285 236 149 17,440 System Reflection RuntimeMethodInfo 27,456 System Reflections: Seneric Dictionary(System String, System String)+Entry[] 55,680 System Object[] 64,224 System Reflection RuntimeParameterInfo 7ffa7a77a0f0 7ffa7a8730e0 80 11 152,208 System.Int32[] 249,480 System.Diagnostics.Tracing.EventSource+EventMetadata[] ffa7a87925 384,300 System String 7ffa/a8937c8 121 386,060 System.Char[
7ffa/a870318 443 3,037,149 System.Byte[
Total 8,446 objects, 4,616,918 bytes

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Communication

Fiddler

Fiddler Classic is still free to download and use

Wireshark

Network Monitor (NetMon, deprecated)

Message Analyzer (deprecated)

Winpcap

TCPView

Spy++

RPCMon


Pipe Monitor


Mailslot Monitor

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
	A → 🗗											
Pro	cess /	PID	Protocol	Local Address	Local Port	Remote Address	Remote Port	State	Sent Packets	Sent Bytes	Rovd Packets	Rovd Bytes
100	[System Process]	0	TCP	desktop-eihj7rk	64139	20.189.173.22	https	TIME_WAIT				
	jhi_service.exe	4932	TCPV6	[0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1]	49670	desktop-eihj7rk	0	LISTENING				
	Isass.exe	956	TCP	DESKTOP-EIHJ7	49664		0	LISTENING				
	Isass.exe	956	TCPV6	desktop-eihj7rk	49664	desktop-eihj7rk	0	LISTENING				
	msedge.exe	3516	TCP	desktop-eihj7rk	64138	204.79.197.239	https	ESTABLISHED				
	SearchApp.exe	8768	TCP	desktop-eihj7rk	64119	a92-123-104-29.d		CLOSE_WAIT				
	SearchApp.exe	8768	TCP	desktop-eihj7rk	64120	a104-126-37-184		CLOSE_WAIT				
	services.exe	932	TCP	DESKTOP-EIHJ7	49674	DESKTOP-EIHJ7		LISTENING				
	services.exe	932	TCPV6	desktop-eihj7rk	49674	desktop-eihj7rk	0	LISTENING				
	spoolsv.exe	4364 4364	TCP TCPV6		49669 49669	DESKTOP-EIHJ7	U N	LISTENING				
	spoolsv.exe	1076	TCP	desktop-eihj7rk DESKTOP-EIHJ7		desktop-eihj7rk DESKTOP-EIHJ7		LISTENING LISTENING				
	svchost.exe svchost.exe	1208	TCP	DESKTOP-EIHJ7		DESKTOP-EIHJ7		LISTENING				
	svchost.exe svchost.exe	4092	TCP	DESKTOP-EIHJ7		DESKTOP-EIHJ7		LISTENING				
	svchost.exe svchost.exe	1304	TCP	DESKTOP-EIHJ7		DESKTOP-EIHJ7		LISTENING				
	svchost.exe	2220	TCP	DESKTOP-EIHJ7		DESKTOP-EIHJ7		LISTENING				
	svchost.exe	1872	TCP	DESKTOP-EIHJ7		DESKTOP-EIHJ7		LISTENING				
	svchost.exe	5300	TCP	desktop-eihj7rk	63982	40.113.110.67	https	ESTABLISHED				
	svchost.exe	6436	TCP	DESKTOP-EIHJ7		DESKTOP-EIHJ7	0	LISTENING				
	svchost.exe	1356	UDP	DESKTOP-EIHJ7		×	×					
	svchost.exe	7748	UDP	DESKTOP-EIHJ7	ssdp	×	×					
	svchost.exe	7748	UDP	desktop-eihj7rk	ssdp	×	×					
	svchost.exe	1208	UDP	DESKTOP-EIHJ7	ms-wbt-server	×	×					
	svchost.exe	4092	UDP	DESKTOP-EIHJ7	5050	×	×					
# #	svchost.exe	4072	UDP	DESKTOP-EIHJ7		×	×					
# F	svchost.exe	4072	UDP	DESKTOP-EIHJ7		×	×					
	svchost.exe	4628	UDP	DESKTOP-EIHJ7		×	×					
	svchost.exe	7748	UDP	desktop-eihj7rk	64262	×	×					
	svchost.exe	7748	UDP		64263	×	×					
	svchost.exe	1076	TCPV6	[0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0]	epmap	[0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0]	0	LISTENING				
	svchost.exe	1208	TCPV6	desktop-eihj7rk	ms-wbt-server	desktop-eihj7rk	0	LISTENING				
	svchost.exe	6436	TCPV6	desktop-eihj7rk	ms-do	desktop-eihj7rk	0	LISTENING				
	svchost.exe	1304	TCPV6	desktop-eihj7rk	49666	desktop-eihj7rk	0	LISTENING				
	svchost.exe	2220 1872	TCPV6 TCPV6	desktop-eihj7rk	49667	desktop-eihj7rk	0	LISTENING				
	svchost.exe svchost.exe	1356	UDPV6	desktop-eihj7rk desktop-eihj7rk	49668 123	desktop-eihj7rk		LISTENING				
	svcnost.exe svchost.exe	7748	UDPV6	[0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1]	1900	н	н					
	svchost.exe svchost.exe	1208	UDPV6	desktop-eihi7rk	ms-wbt-server	н	н					
	svchost.exe	7748	UDPV6	[0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1]	64261	н	н					
	System	4	TCP	desktop-eihi7rk	netbios-ssn	DESKTOP-EIHJ7	0	LISTENING				
	System	4	TCP		microsoft-ds	DESKTOP-EIHJ7		LISTENING				
	System	4	UDP	desktop-eihj7rk	netbios-ns	*	H					
	System	4	UDP	desktop-eihj7rk	netbios-dgm	н	н					
	System	4	TCPV6	desktop-eihj7rk	microsoft-ds	desktop-eihj7rk	0	LISTENING				
111	SystemEater.exe	7864	UDP	DESKTOP-EIHJ7	58226	н	н					
	SystemEater.exe	7864	UDP	DESKTOP-EIHJ7	58462	н	н					
	SystemEater.exe	7864	UDP	DESKTOP-EIHJ7	59177	н	н					
	SystemEater.exe	7864	UDP	DESKTOP-EIHJ7	59178	н	н					
	SystemEater.exe	7864	UDP	DESKTOP-EIHJ7	59179	×	×					
	SystemEater.exe	7864	UDP	DESKTOP-EIHJ7	59180	×	×					
	SystemEater.exe	7864	UDP	DESKTOP-EIHJ7	59181							
	SystemEater.exe	7864	UDP	DESKTOP-EIHJ7	59182							
	SystemEater.exe	7864	UDP	DESKTOP-EIHJ7	59183	v v						
	SystemEater.exe	7864	UDP UDP	DESKTOP-EIHJ7	59184	×	×					
	SystemEater.exe SystemEater.exe	7864 7864	UDP	DESKTOP-EIHJ7 DESKTOP-EIHJ7	59185 59186	×	×					
	Systembater.exe SystemBater.exe	7864 7864	UDP	DESKTOP-EIHJ7	59186	*	×					
	Systemmater.exe SystemEater.exe	7864 7864	UDP	DESKTOP-EIHJ7	59188	*	*					
	Systemmater.exe SystemEater.exe	7864 7864	UDP	DESKTOP-EIHJ7	59189	×	н					
	wininit.exe	788	TCP	DESKTOP-EIHJ7	49665	DESKTOP-EIHJ7	n	LISTENING				
	wininit.exe	788	TCPV6	desktop-eihi7rk	49665	desktop-eihi7rk	ő	LISTENING				
							-					

Activate Windows





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



DID	TID	I D. M.	LILIED	Maria	6 :	E e	B	le i ii	The second of	T IN
PID	TID	ProcessName	UUID	Module	Service	Function	Protocol	Endpoint	ImpersonationLevel	TaskName ^
5216	3484		11f25515-c879-400a-989e-b074d5f092fe	lsm.dll	LSM		LRPC	LSMApi	Impersonate	RpcClientCallStart
1128	4380		11f25515-c879-400a-989e-b074d5f092fe	lsm.dll	LSM		LRPC	LSMApi	Default	RpcServerCallStart
1524	1976	svchost	00000136-0000-0000-c000-000000000046	rpcss.dll	RpcSs	SCMActivatorCreateInstance	LRPC	epmapper	Impersonate	RpcClientCallStart
1076	8456		00000136-0000-0000-c000-000000000046	rpcss.dll	RpcSs		LRPC	epmapper	Default	RpcServerCallStart
1076	8456	svchost	00000132-0000-0000-c000-000000000046	N\A	N\A	N\A	LRPC	OLE951E60D9F86E61D184DC8C7AF8AE	Impersonate	RpcClientCallStart
1524	8064	svchost	00000132-0000-0000-c000-000000000046	N\A	N\A	N\A	LRPC	OLE951E60D9F86E61D184DC8C7AF8AE	Default	RpcServerCallStart
1524	8064	svchost	e60c73e6-88f9-11cf-9af1-0020af6e72f4	rpcss.dll	RpcSs	ServerAllocateOIDs	LRPC	epmapper	Impersonate	RpcClientCallStart
1076	5708	svchost	e60c73e6-88f9-11cf-9af1-0020af6e72f4	rpcss.dll	RpcSs	ServerAllocateOIDs	LRPC	epmapper	Default	RpcServerCallStart
5216	3952	SECOMN64	11f25515-c879-400a-989e-b074d5f092fe	lsm.dll	LSM	RpcGetUserToken	LRPC	LSMApi	Impersonate	RpcClientCallStart
1128	4380	svchost	11f25515-c879-400a-989e-b074d5f092fe	lsm.dll	LSM	RpcGetUserToken	LRPC	LSMApi	Default	RpcServerCallStart
5216	11148	SECOMN64	11f25515-c879-400a-989e-b074d5f092fe	lsm.dll	LSM	RpcGetUserToken	LRPC	LSMApi	Impersonate	RpcClientCallStart
1128	4380	svchost	11f25515-c879-400a-989e-b074d5f092fe	lsm.dll	LSM	RpcGetUserToken	LRPC	LSMApi	Default	RpcServerCallStart
1524	1976		00000136-0000-0000-c000-000000000046	rpcss.dll	RpcSs		LRPC	epmapper	Impersonate	RpcClientCallStart
1076	8456		00000136-0000-0000-c000-000000000046	rpcss.dll	RpcSs		LRPC	epmapper	Default	RpcServerCallStart
1076	8456		00000132-0000-0000-c000-00000000046		N/A		LRPC	OLE951E60D9F86E61D184DC8C7AF8AE	Impersonate	RpcClientCallStart
1524	8064		00000132-0000-0000-c000-000000000046		N\A		LRPC	OLE951E60D9F86E61D184DC8C7AF8AE	Default	RpcServerCallStart
3504	2872		4f32adc8-6052-4a04-8701-293ccf2096f0	sspicli.dll	NVA		LRPC	Isasspirpc	Default	RpcClientCallStart
956										
	8788		4f32adc8-6052-4a04-8701-293ccf2096f0	sspicli.dll			LRPC	Isasspirpc	Default	RpcServerCallStart
3504	2872		4f32adc8-6052-4a04-8701-293ccf2096f0	sspicli.dll			LRPC	Isasspirpc	Default	RpcClientCallStart
956	8788		4f32adc8-6052-4a04-8701-293ccf2096f0	sspicli.dll			LRPC	Isasspirpc	Default	RpcServerCallStart
5216	9328		11f25515-c879-400a-989e-b074d5f092fe	Ism.dll	LSM		LRPC	LSMApi	Impersonate	RpcClientCallStart
1128	4380		11f25515-c879-400a-989e-b074d5f092fe	Ism.dll	LSM		LRPC	LSMApi	Default	RpcServerCallStart
5216	7964	SECOMN64	11f25515-c879-400a-989e-b074d5f092fe	Ism.dll	LSM	RpcGetUserToken	LRPC	LSMApi	Impersonate	RpcClientCallStart
1128	4380	svchost	11f25515-c879-400a-989e-b074d5f092fe	lsm.dll	LSM	RpcGetUserToken	LRPC	LSMApi	Default	RpcServerCallStart
1524	1976	svchost	00000136-0000-0000-c000-000000000046	rpcss.dll	RpcSs	SCMActivatorCreateInstance	LRPC	epmapper	Impersonate	RpcClientCallStart
1076	8456	svchost	00000136-0000-0000-c000-000000000046	rpcss.dll	RpcSs	SCMActivatorCreateInstance	LRPC	epmapper	Default	RpcServerCallStart
1076	8456	svchost	00000132-0000-0000-c000-000000000046	N\A	N\A	N\A	LRPC	OLE951E60D9F86E61D184DC8C7AF8AE	Impersonate	RpcClientCallStart
1524	8064	svchost	00000132-0000-0000-c000-000000000046	N\A	N\A	N\A	LRPC	OLE951E60D9F86E61D184DC8C7AF8AE	Default	RpcServerCallStart
2264	1892	explorer	e60c73e6-88f9-11cf-9af1-0020af6e72f4	pcss.dll	RpcSs	_ServerFreeOXIDAndOIDs	LRPC	epmapper	Impersonate	RpcClientCallStart
1076	8456	svchost	e60c73e6-88f9-11cf-9af1-0020af6e72f4	pcss.dll	RpcSs	_ServerFreeOXIDAndOIDs	LRPC	epmapper	Default	RpcServerCallStart
5216	5800	SECOMN64	11f25515-c879-400a-989e-b074d5f092fe	Ism.dll	LSM	RpcGetUserToken	LRPC	LSMApi	Impersonate	RpcClientCallStart
1128	4380		11f25515-c879-400a-989e-b074d5f092fe	lsm.dll	LSM		LRPC	LSMApi	Default	RpcServerCallStart
5216	7464		11f25515-c879-400a-989e-b074d5f092fe	Ism.dll	LSM		LRPC	LSMApi	Impersonate	RpcClientCallStart
1128	4380		11f25515-c879-400a-989e-b074d5f092fe	Ism.dll	LSM		LRPC	LSMApi	Default	RpcServerCallStart
1524	1976		00000136-0000-0000-c000-000000000046	rpcss.dll	RpcSs		LRPC	epmapper	Impersonate	RpcClientCallStart
1076	8456			mcss.dll			LRPC			
	0.00		00000136-0000-0000-c000-000000000046	·	RpcSs			epmapper	Default	RpcServerCallStart
1076	8456		00000132-0000-0000-c000-000000000046		N/A		LRPC	OLE951E60D9F86E61D184DC8C7AF8AE	Impersonate	RpcClientCallStart
1524	8064		00000132-0000-0000-00000000000046		N\A		LRPC	OLE951E60D9F86E61D184DC8C7AF8AE	Default	RpcServerCallStart
5216	7780		11f25515-c879-400a-989e-b074d5f092fe	lsm.dll	LSM		LRPC	LSMApi	Impersonate	RpcClientCallStart
1128	4380		11f25515-c879-400a-989e-b074d5f092fe	lsm.dll	LSM		LRPC	LSMApi	Default	RpcServerCallStart
5216	10252		11f25515-c879-400a-989e-b074d5f092fe	Ism.dll	LSM		LRPC	LSMApi	Impersonate	RpcClientCallStart
1128	4380		11f25515-c879-400a-989e-b074d5f092fe	Ism.dll	LSM		LRPC	LSMApi	Default	RpcServerCallStart
1524	1976		00000136-0000-0000-c000-000000000046	rpcss.dll	RpcSs		LRPC	epmapper	Impersonate	RpcClientCallStart
1076	8456	svchost	00000136-0000-0000-c000-0000000000046	rpcss.dll	RpcSs	SCMActivatorCreateInstance	LRPC	epmapper	Default	RpcServerCallStart
1076	8456	svchost	00000132-0000-0000-c000-000000000046	N\A	N\A	N\A	LRPC	OLE951E60D9F86E61D184DC8C7AF8AE	Impersonate	RpcClientCallStart
1524	8064	svchost	00000132-0000-0000-c000-000000000046	N\A	N\A	N\A	LRPC	OLE951E60D9F86E61D184DC8C7AF8AE	Default	RpcServerCallStart
5216	6060	SECOMN64	11f25515-c879-400a-989e-b074d5f092fe	lsm.dll	LSM	RpcGetUserToken	LRPC	LSMApi	Impersonate	RpcClientCallStart
1128	4380	svchost	11f25515-c879-400a-989e-b074d5f092fe	lsm.dll	LSM	RpcGetUserToken	LRPC	LSMApi	Default	RpcServerCallStart
3672	10528	RuntimeBroker	412f241e-c12a-11ce-abff-0020af6e7a17	rpcss.dll	RpcSs	ServerRevokeClsid	LRPC	epmapper	Impersonate	RpcClientCallStart
1076	8456		412f241e-c12a-11ce-abff-0020af6e7a17	rpcss.dll	RpcSs	ServerRevokeClsid	LRPC	epmapper	Default	RpcServerCallStart
7712	11236		9d420415-b8fb-4f4a-8c53-4502ead30ca9	PlaySndSrv.dll			LRPC	PlaySoundKRpc2	Default	RpcServerCallStart
5216	4192		11f25515-c879-400a-989e-b074d5f092fe	Ism.dll	LSM		LRPC	LSMApi	Impersonate	RpcClientCallStart
1128	4380		11f25515-c879-400a-989e-b074d5f092fe	Ism.dll	LSM		LRPC	LSMApi	Default	RpcServerCallStart
1524	1976		00000136-0000-0000-c000-000000000046	mcss.dll	RpcSs		LRPC	epmapper	Impersonate	RpcClientCallStart
1076	8456		00000136-0000-0000-c000-00000000046	mcss.dll			LRPC		D ()	
	8456			<u>'</u>	RpcSs			epmapper	Default Activate V	RpcServerCallStart
1076	0.00		00000132-0000-0000-c000-000000000046		N\A		LRPC	OLE951E60D9F86E61D184DC8C7AF8AE	Impersonate Go to Setting	RpcClientCallStartVindows.
1524			00000132-0000-0000-c000-000000000046	N\A			LRPC	OLE951E60D9F86E61D184DC8C7AF8AE	Default	RpcServerCallStart
5216	3496	SECOMN64	11f25515-c879-400a-989e-b074d5f092fe	lsm.dll	LSM	RpcGetUserToken	LRPC	LSMApi	Impersonate	RpcClientCallStart 🗸

Debugging

CTRL+ALT+HOME activates the connection bar. Please change that to a different combination.

HTTPS://LEARN.MICROSOFT.COM/ENUS/WINDOWS/WIN32/TERMSERV/TERMINAL-SERVICES-SHORTCUTKEYS






mstscax!PAL_System_Win32_ThreadProcWrapper+0x32

KERNEL32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0x14 ntdl1!Rt1UserThreadStart+0x21

*** Unable to resolve 18 00007ff9`f4c47344

00007ff9`f58a26b1

1a 00000000`00000000



r8,[mstscax!WPP_f5f71bb7bac236b27f26969128cc1e12_Traceguids (00007ff9'9fa54070)]

00007ff9`9f487602 4c8d0567ca5c00

00007ff9`9f487609 448bc8

BUSY Debuggee is running.

00007ff9'9f48760c bafd000000

00007ff9`9f487611 488b4910

lea

mov

mov

mov

r9d,eax

edx,OFDh

rcx, qword ptr [rcx+10h]


Recap

We found the keyboard event handler.

We modified the *if-else* conditions to check a different key combination.

Audio is lagging behind in *mstsc.exe*.

FIX IT PLEASE



Audio and Video

We don't have access to the *mstsc.exe* source code.

We are on our own (nobody's going to help us).

We can use only publicly available materials.

We know nothing about *mstsc.exe*:

- What programming language it's written in
- How it downloads, stores, and plays audio and video
- Why it's getting out of sync

Audio and Video

We can reproduce the problem.

We notice that the sound gets delayed after our computer is overloaded.

We know RDP defines virtual data channels.

- https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/explain-like-i-m-5-remote-desktopprotocol-rdp
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows protocols/ms-rdsod/072543f9-4bd4-4dc6ab97-9a04bf9d2c6a
- https://github.com/MicrosoftDocs/SupportArticles-docs/blob/main/support/windowsserver/remote/understanding-remote-desktop-protocol.md

We may suspect that audio and video are sent via different channels with no timestamps or time markers.

Approach 1: Implement timestamping

Difficult, as we have no access to source code.

However, RDP implements virtual data channels, so we can implement plugins.

There are applications doing that, for instance **Sound For Remote Desktop**: https://www.sound-over-rdp.com/

Approach 2: Decrease the buffer length

The incoming audio must be buffered somewhere.

If we find the buffer, we can shorten it.

Hard to do because:

- The buffer is probably initialized at the application startup
- We don't know how the buffer length is determined it could be a constant integer, determined based on allocation metadata, or determined automatically
- We don't know if there is one buffer or many
- It's hard to find the buffer without knowing its content

Approach 3: Empty the buffer periodically

Hard to do because:

- We don't know where the pointer to the current position in the buffer is
- We need to avoid race conditions
- And we still can't find the buffer easily

Approach 4: Find the call site and cut the buffer in half

Let's find where the audio is played.

Let's patch the call site.

Let's shorten the buffer by half based on some random sampling.

waveOutPrepareHeader function (mmeapi.h)

Article • 04/02/2021 ♦ Feedback

In this article

```
Syntax
Parameters
Return value
Remarks
Show 2 more
```

The waveOutPrepareHeader function prepares a waveform-audio data block for playback.

Syntax

```
MMRESULT waveOutPrepareHeader(
HWAVEOUT hwo,
LPWAVEHDR pwh,
UINT cbwh
);
```

Parameters

```
hwo
```

Handle to the waveform-audio output device.

pwh

Pointer to a WAVEHDR structure that identifies the data block to be prepared.

cbwh

Size, in bytes, of the WAVEHDR structure.

WAVEHDR structure

Article • 06/06/2016

In this article

```
Syntax
Members
Remarks
Requirements
See also
```


The WAVEHDR structure defines the header used to identify a waveform-audio buffer.

Syntax

ADAM FURMANEK

```
C++
typedef struct wavehdr tag {
  LPSTR
                     lpData;
  DWORD
                     dwBufferLength;
                     dwBytesRecorded;
  DWORD
  DWORD PTR
                     dwUser;
  DWORD
                     dwFlags;
  DWORD
                     dwLoops;
  struct wavehdr_tag *lpNext;
  DWORD PTR
                     reserved;
} WAVEHDR, *LPWAVEHDR;
```

86



0:030>|

Recap

We found the call site of the audio WinAPI method.

We patched the call site to jump to our custom payload.

We sampled the audio packets based on the address of user data.

We modified the length of the packets before they were delivered to WinAPI.

Summary

Debugging is neither harder nor easier than coding. It's different.

It's a completely different skill for which we need new tools.

Great minds think alike. We need to know how others do things.

Ultimately, it's just a bunch of bytes.

Q&A



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
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Random IT Utensils

IT, operating systems, maths, and more.

Thanks!

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